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Post-Soviet parties of power are dominant parties created in the years after the 
collapse of the USSR. It is not a type of political party, but a term that means 
that executives form them, producing a legal and illegal advantage over other 
parties in elections and in the daily allocation of resources. This paper attempts 
to determine if the Kazakh party of power Nur Otan is also a hegemonic party 
along the line with Sartori’s definition. I argue that party of power could be any 
dominant party, including a hegemonic party, and hence we need further analysis 
to identify its appropriate typological definition. The answer to this question is 
not only important for the purpose of typological labelling, rather its importance 
lies in aiding our ability to gain insight into the existing Kazakh authoritarian 
regime’s institutional framework of sustainability. After the analysis, the paper 
comes to the conclusion that Nur Otan is a hegemonic party, but it is a new 
subtype of the hegemonic party that achieves hegemony within the party system, 
but not within the whole political system as a classic hegemonic party of the 20th 
century. Therefore, it contributes to the current stability of the autocratic regime, 
but the institutional framework of the regime’s sustainability after the departure 
of Nursultan Nazarbayev from the state presidency is not certain.
Keywords: presidential-hegemonic party, hegemonic party, autocracy, Ka-
zakhstan, Nur Otan
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I. INTRODUCTION**
The third wave of democratization had one thing in common with the pre-
vious waves and the Arab Spring – limited success. This limitation is the result 
of the fact that in some countries delegative democracy of the Latin American 
type1, illiberal democracy or any defective democracy, let alone any form of 
modern liberal democracy has not been established. New authoritarian regimes 
created after 1991 disabled their countries’ democratic transitions after vari-
ous durations of wandering from communism to “something else”. The most 
obvious examples are found among the Central Asian countries Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, which have experienced the harsh regimes of Presidents 
Islam Karimov, Saparmurat Niyazov Türkmenbaşy and Gurbanguly Berdimu-
hamedow. In these former Soviet states, there are still no democratic elections 
nor multiparty systems, and their leaders have been surrounded by aides who 
have crucially depended on their patronage. Their authority has been so devel-
oped that these regimes are more like the sultanist regime of Romanian Presi-
dent Nicolae Ceausescu2 than of any Soviet leader after Stalin. Karimov and 
Türkmenbaşy have not only had “control that outgoing rulers exerted over the 
process of transition”3, but they did not slacken any control from their hands 
after the transition from communism to a new authoritarian regime.
In an autocracy there is no real separation of powers because it contradicts 
the very nature of this type of political system. Therefore, its bearers must find 
the appropriate institutions that will help them to rule and at the same time 
prevent sharing political power with others. These institutions are usually the 
same ones that exist in liberal democracies albeit they function with a different 
purpose. While in liberal democracies rule of law, a mechanism of checks and 
balances and civic political culture make the abuse of institutions by the re-
gime difficult, the authorities in an autocratic system can do this because there 
**  This article has been written as a result of a research visit to the Eurasian National 
University L. N. Gumilyov in Astana in the framework of the “Euro-Asian Coopera-
tion for Excellence and Advancement II” in a period February 1 - 28, 2015.
1 O’Donnell, G., Delegative Democracy, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1994, pp. 
55 – 69.
2 More about sultanism in Romania in: Linz, J. J.; Stepan, A., Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Eu-
rope, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996.
3 Munck, G. L.; Skalnik Leff, C., Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America 
and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
1997, p. 344.
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is a lack in any of these factors. But, there are some limitations because mod-
ern autocracies do not have the same characteristics as the classic autocracies 
of the 20th century. A higher degree of political pluralism, wider education, 
easier information access to citizens and a better functioning of the legal sys-
tem, make it difficult for the regimes of most of these countries to concentrate 
as much power in their hands as was possible in the past. The consequence of 
this is that a contemporary autocratic regime is never completely sure of its 
inviolability. To reduce this risk, the regime puts more emphasis on formal 
structures of government, and respect of the constitution and laws concerning 
political institutions than before because through them it is able to legalize its 
decisions and increase its own legitimacy. It acts as a rational actor, who, with-
in the legal order and the institutions that it created, attempts to maximize its 
benefits.4 At the same time, it must constantly adapt to external threats that 
might endanger it and adapts laws and decisions in order to defeat its enemies. 
Because of these dynamics within a new autocratic system, the term “consoli-
dated autocratic system”, as it is used in much of the literature on autocracies, 
becomes meaningless as it is in the nature of every autocracy that it cannot be 
consolidated. It can be frozen or stabilized, if the regime is strengthened and it 
is reasonably foreseeable that it will last for a longer period, but because there 
are forces that are constantly trying to overthrow the existing government, 
or transform the entire system, an autocratic system cannot be consolidated. 
The prohibition and disruption of the activity of anti-regime forces and their 
persecution by the regime can only appease them for a while, but all autocratic 
systems are potentially unstable and may end with the fall of the regime, or at 
least they fall victim to the pressure for change.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
This article is based on an institutionalist approach in the research of new 
authoritarian systems and based on the analysis of one type of institution – the 
political party. The analysis will be conducted on the case of Kazakhstan and 
the Nur Otan party, which has been used by the regime since its founding in 
1999 for the regime’s own sustainability and stabilization. In order to success-
fully execute this analysis, I will try to determine if Nur Otan is a hegemonic 
4 More about institutionalism of rational choice in: Peters, B. G., Institutional theory 
in political science. The new institutionalism, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, New York and London, 2012.
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party in accordance with Sartori’s definition5 or if it is some other type of par-
ty. The answer is not important for just reasons of clarity and typological labe-
ling, but primarily because by understanding the type of party the regime uses 
to maintain its hold on power we can gain insight into the sustainability of the 
current authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan. There is a certain amount of liter-
ature about this party and the Kazakhstan political system, but rarely has the 
literature tried to determine what type of party rules the country. For example, 
Max Bader writes about this problem and he sets Nur Otan, along with some 
other post-Soviet parties of power, as a hegemonic party. Nevertheless, it is 
unclear if his use of this term is in accordance with Sartori’s definition, or if he 
uses it as a term that should emphasize the party’s dominant position without 
being hegemonic. Bader offers that, “a political party is hegemonic when, over 
the course of consecutive elections, it wins a share of the vote that is several 
times bigger than that of its competitors, and controls a large majority of seats 
in parliament.”6 I argue that this could be a definition of any dominant party, 
including a predominant party of the Sartori type, and hence we need further 
analysis to identify its appropriate typological definition. 
Considering the greater degree of political pluralism and the lesser ability 
of the Kazakh regime to control society, the media and means of communica-
tion than in the Soviet system, I offer the thesis that the President of Kazakh-
stan decided to integrate himself into the party system and to consolidate his 
power with a hegemonic political party, which seeks to achieve its dominance 
through semi-competitive elections formalized by laws and other legal acts. I 
suggest that it is a new subtype of the hegemonic party, a presidential-hegem-
onic party. I do this because its founder and patron is the President who does 
not depend on that party as much as the party depends on him and therefore 
its hegemony is primarily possible in the party system, but not in the political 
system as a whole, as it is possible for the hegemony of two classic subtypes 
of the hegemonic party defined by Sartori. In order to provide robust support 
for my thesis I engage in an analysis of the relevant legal acts and the politi-
cal practice in Kazakhstan since 1991. Due to the interconnection of political 
subsystems, attention will also be given to elections and institutions of the 
system of government.
5 Sartori, G., Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, ECPR Press, Colches-
ter, 2005, pp. 204 – 205 (First published in 1976 by Cambridge University Press.).
6 Bader, M., hegemonic political parties in post-Soviet Eurasia: Towards party-based authori-
tarianism?, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2011, p. 189.
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III. ELECTIONS AND PARTIES IN MODERN AUTOCRACIES
The sustainability of political institutions is an important element in mod-
ern democracies. It allows them to be rooted in society and provides accept-
ance of the democratic system as legitimate among citizens, offering greater 
predictability for the behavior and activities of political actors. It also allows 
for the efficient creating and managing of policies within a firm set of behavio-
ral patterns that do not require spending resources on establishing new rules. 
The durability of institutions is closely linked to the consolidation of a given 
political system, which is desired in democracies, but cases from the 20th cen-
tury show that various autocratic regimes wanted to achieve this durability 
too. In autocratic regimes that were ruled by some organization, one of the 
most widespread organizations was the political party that operated within 
the one-party or hegemonic party system. Thus, the hegemonic parties in com-
munist Poland and in Mexico dominated for decades, regardless of the changes 
of their leaders. After the departure of each parties’ leader from office, the 
hegemonic parties endured as the bearers of autocratic regimes and hegemons 
in the political system as a whole. In some post-Soviet countries, where today 
there is a dominant party we are not sure whether the same thing is happen-
ing. There, the change of power is rare compared to Western democracies, 
therefore it is difficult to give a certain forecast of what will happen to the 
regime when the rule of the current President ends. In Turkmenistan, for ex-
ample, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) survived after the death 
of Türkmenbaşy, but that was, among other things, possible because until 
2012 Turkmenistan was a one-party system in which DPT had no competi-
tion. Other post-Soviet autocracies have multiparty systems and the Turkmen 
scenario seems less likely.
In addition to the increased importance of parties, elections in these coun-
tries also have a greater role than in the authoritarian systems of the second 
half of the 20th century. Schedler argues that in contrast to closed autocracy, 
in which access to the legislative and executive power is blocked, elections are 
an important element in electoral authoritarianism, which exists in part of the 
post-Soviet countries.7 A similar claim is one of Reuter and Robertson who be-
lieve that victory in the election is extremely important for the stability of such 
7 Schedler, A., The logic of electoral authoritarianism, in: Schedler, A. (ed.), Electoral Au-
thoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, Boulder, London, 2006, pp. 1 – 
23.
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regimes.8 In such systems elites seek to survive in power after each election, 
and they will seek to do that at almost any cost. Because of such intentions, 
political institutions that exist in consolidated democracies are perverted in 
their non-democratic counterparts. The authoritarian building of institutions 
is not easy because, according to Bunce and Wolchik, the elite must take into 
account the fact that their citizens even in elections during the Soviet period 
learned something about politics, although these elections were undemocrat-
ic.9 Because of that and of the progress in respect for human rights and politi-
cal freedoms, a mere abuse of institutions and the arbitrary creation of politi-
cal processes are more limited than in the past so the regime must be wieldy in 
choosing the type of institution that will enable it to abuse power and give it 
an advantage in relation to other actors. In this process different combinations 
are possible, depending on specific factors and the knowledge and skills of the 
actors involved.
To make it easier, they need formal rules that seemingly, equally bind all. 
Both in old and new autocracies, regimes have sought to maintain an illusion 
of legality by seemingly respecting the procedures of governing that have been 
prescribed by the constitution and positive legislation. In the new authoritari-
anism, this is even more pronounced as information to citizens about “some-
thing else” is more accessible than before and the manipulation of the public 
by the regime is more difficult. Authorities are therefore forced to use political 
institutions in a more sophisticated way and cannot openly show disdain for 
political pluralism by nominating only one candidate in a single mandate dis-
trict, but must allow electoral competition for other actors as well.10 What the 
authorities can do though is aggravate candidacy, making access to power to 
remain limited or as virtually closed as before. And with this issue, a country’s 
constitution and laws show themselves to be important tools for the regime. If 
circumstances allow for the formation of political parties that will be able to be 
8 Reuter, J. O.; Robertson, G. B., Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: 
Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, 
No. 4, 2012, p. 1026.
9 Bunce, V. J.; Wolchik, S. L., Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2006, p. 9.
10 “Although many oil-rich leaders can use other less costly strategies such as electoral 
fraud to win elections, there is added incentive to win elections by seemingly more 
legitimate means.” (Kendall-Taylor, A., Purchasing Power: Oil, Elections and Regime 
Durability in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64,  No. 4, 2012, 
p. 740).
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dominant in the country, the electoral system based on law has a role to pre-
serve this domination in the future. This party quickly becomes dominant and, 
as Bagashka argues, plays a significant role for the president because “[t]he 
dominant party in such regimes secures electoral victories for the authoritarian 
leader, controls congress, mobilizes broad political support for the leader, and 
resolves conflicts within the political elite.”11 In the post-Soviet space this ac-
tor is usually a party of power. This is not a distinct type of party nor does that 
term indicate the type of a party system within which it operates. It is a party 
that is associated with the president or the government which it (the party) 
controls and its goal is to win the parliamentary elections and to control the 
parliament enabling the concentration of the political power in the executive. 
It uses administrative and other resources available to the regime to gain an 
advantage over its opponents and often is the only nationalized political par-
ty12, i.e., the only one that is able to root itself throughout the whole country. 
Such a strategy of the regime in institution building indicates that the strategy 
is focused on meeting the needs of the current holders of political positions, 
not the building of a lasting system.
IV. PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE DOMINANT AND HEGEMONIC 
PARTY
While part of the literature on political and party systems in post-Soviet 
countries often cites these countries’ main parties as dominant, most often 
there is no an attempt by authors to explain what they consider a dominant 
party to be. The dominant party is not a type of political party, but a term 
that indicates the dominance of one party in a political system, regardless of 
whether the system is democratic or autocratic. If we want to determine its 
true type we need to look at the political system in which that party operates. 
In democratic systems this type of party should be considered a predominant 
party and in autocratic systems it should be considered a hegemonic party.13 
However, this typology stems from the mid-1970s when Sartori’s book on 
parties and party systems was published. Today, it is questionable whether the 
11 Bagashka, T., Presidentialism and the Development of Party Systems in hybrid Regimes: 
Russia 2000 - 2003, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2012, p. 94.
12 Tiemann, G., The Nationalization of political parties and party systems in post-communist 
Eastern Europe, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 - 2, 2012, 
pp. 77 – 89.
13 More about differences between those two types of parties in: Sartori, op. cit. (fn. 5).
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old classifications and typologies are still applicable. Even the simplest ones, 
like the democracy-autocracy dichotomy have become useless as new forms 
of categories and types have emerged and a number of transitional units exist 
between them. Moreover, the use and introduction of new terms and concepts 
in political theory has become so complicated over time that working with 
such a variety of concepts requires a semantic and grammatical interpretation 
that tries to reveal what the author thought of the concept when it was intro-
duced or what she should think about it. Sartori’s warning about conceptual 
stretching14, Collier and Levitsky’s warning about the different terms that are 
used for different forms of democratic and non-democratic regimes15, similar 
to Schedler’s view that there is a difference between not liberal-democratic, 
hybrid and authoritarian regimes16 are some of the indications that there is a 
problem with the field’s use of a number of terms that are often used for the 
same phenomenon, or at the other end, the same term is used for a variety 
of phenomena. Thus, already in the definition of the hegemonic party and 
its party system there is a problem. Although one might think that this is the 
term Sartori took from Jerzy Wiatr, Wiatr defines a hegemonic political party 
system in the following way:
“…where all the existing parties form a lasting coalition within which 
one of them is accepted as the leading force of the coalition.”17
Giovanni Sartori has defined the hegemonic party in the following manner:
“The hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto com-
petition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second 
class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete with 
the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal basis. 
Not only does alternation not occur in fact; it cannot occur, since the 
possibility of a rotation in power is not even envisaged. The implica-
tion is that the hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is 
liked or not. While the predominant party remains submissive to the 
14 Sartori, G., Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1970, pp. 1033 – 1053.
15 Collier, D.; Levitsky, S., Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Compara-
tive Research, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1997, pp. 430 – 451.
16 Schedler, A., What is Democratic Consolidation?, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
1998, pp. 91 - 107.
17 Wiatr, J. J., Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland, 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1970, p. 1239.
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conditions that make for a responsible government, no real sanction 
commits the hegemonic party to responsiveness. Whatever its policy, 
its domination cannot be challenged.”18
From this it is clear that Sartori took Wiatr’s term, but it is also obvious 
that he did not adopt Wiatr’s concept. The concept corresponds to the time 
when the article was written and to the country and the institution in which he 
lived and worked, i.e., communist Poland in 1970 and the University of War-
saw. Instead of the Wiatr’s “lasting coalition” in which parties are independent 
of each other19, Sartori clearly says that it is a hegemony of one party that the 
other cannot jeopardize. He further splits this type of a hegemonic party into 
two subtypes – an ideological-hegemonic party, whose prototype was the Pol-
ish United Workers’ Party (PUWP), and pragmatic-hegemonic party, which is 
less authoritarian and whose prototype was the Mexican Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (IRP).20
Since publishing his book in 1974, the differences among the hegemonic 
parties have deepened as undemocratic regimes in the world have changed. 
The literature also refers to the hegemonic parties in Indonesia, Taiwan, Zam-
bia and others21, although the political systems of those countries are very 
different. In addition to the geographical and cultural factors, differences be-
tween political systems are caused by the passage of time. However, what is 
important for the definition of the hegemonic party even today, is that it oper-
ates within a formal multi-party system and its power is guaranteed either by 
legal acts, and, or, using the government’s and other resources for the purpose 
of remaining in power. Other parties cannot overthrow it, despite the existence 
of multi-party elections. This hegemony is characterized by a durability that 
can last for decades, making the typological designation of the dominant party 
in Kazakhstan as a hegemonic party important: through it we can hypothesize 
about the sustainability of the existing authoritarian regime, regardless of who 
will be the President at a given moment.
18 Sartori, op. cit. (fn. 5), pp. 204 – 205.
19 Wiatr citira Gomulkinu izjavu o tome: Wiatr, op. cit. (fn. 17), p. 1241.
20 Sartori, op. cit. (fn. 5), p. 205.
21 For example: Suryadinata, L., The Decline of the hegemonic Party System in Indonesia: 
Golkar after the Fall of Soeharto, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007, 
pp. 333 – 358; Burnell, P., The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities 
Past, Present and Future, African Affairs, Vol. 100, No. 399, 2001, pp. 239 – 263; 
Solinger, D. J., Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Journal of De-
mocracy, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2001, pp. 30 – 42.
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V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY SYSTEM OF KAZAKHSTAN AF-
TER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR
The historical legacy of communism and the absence of developed state 
structures affected the political and social processes in Kazakhstan after the 
collapse of the USSR. The country’s pre-communist heritage, which is often 
mentioned as one of the factors of success of the democratic transition in 
Central Europe, could not have had a big impact on Kazakhstan because the 
country did not have a rich political history. Thus the creation of new institu-
tions after the collapse of the Soviet system could not have had any significant 
historical role models that could have served as an example for their design. 
The lack of a historical, political heritage contributed to the general lack of 
people’s knowledge about democracy, thus the freedom for building and de-
signing institutions turned into an arbitrary process guided by the govern-
ment apparatus that was free to form a new political system according to its 
own interests. Cummings therefore was able to conclude that “While the first 
three years witnessed a liberalization of political activity, they also sowed the 
seeds of authoritarianism that had characterized the polity by the close of the 
1990s.”22 In this and the following sections I examine the transformation of 
the political system and the development of the party system of Kazakhstan, 
the formation of the party of power and how it was strengthened with the help 
of the regime, and the suppression of the opposition that could ultimately 
threaten its newfound dominance. By looking at Kazakhstan’s political and 
party system we will be able to better answer the question of whether Nur 
Otan has become a hegemonic party? And if so, what subtype?
The dominant player in Kazakhstan’s politics in the past quarter century 
has been Nursultan Nazarbayev. The communist leader from the late 1980s 
switched, like almost all of his Central Asian counterparts, to the post-com-
munist reality without stepping down from power. In Kazakhstan and Cen-
tral Asian countries, leaders have become the personifications of their coun-
tries23 and “Nazarbayev’s accumulation of personal political power has since 
the beginning of the post-independence period been couched in legalistic, 
constitutional arguments and justified as serving in the national interest of 
22 Cummings, S. N., Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, I. B. Tauris, London and New 
York, 2005, p. 23.
23 Matveeva, A., legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and 
Symbolic Power, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 7, 2009, p. 1100.
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Kazakhstan.”24 Even in Soviet times he belonged to the conservative elites of 
Central Asia that, according to Mishra, in the period of perestroika opposed any 
pluralism which would be manifested in the emergence of new organizations 
and parties.25 He became Prime Minister of Kazakhstan in 1986 and the First 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan 
(CPK) in 1989. Despite being a politician who worked at the level of the 
federal unit, he did not advocate its independence. Instead, in a referendum 
in March 1991 he advocated for the survival of the Soviet Union. In August 
1991, he waited 24 hours before he condemned a coup attempt against Gor-
bachev.26 The final failure of the coup marked the end of any agreement on 
the restructuring of the Soviet Union and the end of the CPSU, resulting in a 
limited future for its republican branches. The next month, the CPK was dis-
solved and in its place the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK) was founded. 
After the abolition of the one-party system in March 1990, parties were cre-
ated in harsh conditions in which they did not enjoy strong social and elec-
toral support, and largely depended on their leaders.27 Nevertheless, there were 
motives for their founding because parties were necessary for easier and more 
effective activity in the political arena. Traditionally, clan organizations in the 
society were extremely important for political activity in Kazakhstan, even 
since the pre-Soviet period28, but in modern times it was difficult to promote 
modernization and at the same time rely on the traditional ways of governing.
Nazarbayev during this time was not yet tied to any party. Since the SPK 
was dominated by ethnic Russians, he supported the establishment of the 
National Congress Party of Kazakhstan (NCPK)29, which was founded in 
June 1992.30 In the early 1990s he also participated in the founding meet-
24 Hess, S. E., Authoritarian landscapes: State Decentralization, Popular Mobilization and 
the Institutional Sources of Resilience in Nondemocracies, Springer-Verlag Gmbh, New 
York, 2013, p. 173.
25 Mishra, M. K., Democratisation Process in Kazakhstan: Gauging the Indicators, India 
Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2009, p. 314.
26 Elliot, G., Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, Foreign Investment & Oil, Louisiana Law Review, 
Vol. 53, No. 4, 1993, p. 1246.
27 Karmazina, L., Institutionalization of the Party System in the Republic of Kazakhstan: Past 
and Present, Central Asia and the Caucusus, No. 5 (53), 2008, p. 42.
28 Collins, K., Clan, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, 2002, pp. 137 – 152.
29 Elliot, op. cit. (fn. 26), p. 1247.
30 Sejdumanov, S. T., Fenomen mnogopartijnosti v Kazahstane, Almati, 2007, p. 28.
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ings of other political organizations, which is evidence to Babak that the ex-
ecutive controlled the formation process of new parties.31 For their further 
development, it was necessary for them to work in a strong parliament, but 
this was not possible because in Kazakhstan, like in Russia and Ukraine, the 
President and Parliament were in open or latent conflict. The coalition “Otan-
Fatherland” was formed in 1994 and it sought to replace Nazarbayev and 
Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko32, but Nazarbayev eventually survived 
the attempt. That was also a highlight of the power of the legislature because 
the newly elected Parliament was dissolved the next year by a decision from 
the constitutional court. After new elections, legislative and executive bodies 
moved into a tighter alignment, thereby decreasing the conflict between the 
two, but the President was still not able to establish a consolidated majority 
government that he could dominate.
In order to become dominant Nazarbayev needed to integrate himself into 
the party system and through it, obtain his domination over the Parliament.33 
He tried to create a strong pro-presidential party from the Socialist Party, 
NCPK or the Union of the People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (UPUK) but he 
failed.34 This failure was, among other things, the result of what Way, in the 
example of Moldova, calls pluralism by default. This means that the autocratic 
government cannot consolidate itself because society and elites are divided 
and the regime fails to establish tight control over them.35 In Kazakhstan, the 
division was reflected in the ethnic heterogeneity of the society in which, at 
the time of independence, no ethnic group formed an absolute majority of 
the population – Kazakhs had only a relative majority of around 40%, only 
slightly more than the Russians who certainly did not look at Nazarbayev as 
their leader. In addition, the Kazakhs have historically been divided into three 
31 Babak, V., Kazakhstan: how Its Multiparty System Came Into Being, Central Asia and 
the Caucusus, No. 2 (32), 2005, p. 83.
32 Olcott, M. B., Kazakstan: Nursultan Nazarbaev as strong president, in: Taras, R. (ed.), 
Postcommunist presidents, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 112.
33 Cindy Skach considers as essential that President in semi-presidential system is 
integrated into a country’s party system because otherwise the whole political sys-
tem may come in a crisis. In: Skach, C., Borrowing Constitutional Design: Constitutional 
law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton and Oxford, 2005, p. 124.
34 Olcott, op. cit. (fn. 32), p. 122.
35 Way, L., Pluralism by Default in Moldova, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4, 
2002, pp. 127 – 141.
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hordes - Small, Medium and Large - which have been further divided into 
clans.36 And finally, the political and business elite are interrelated and must 
take into account the interests of each other in order to succeed and maximize 
their own interests.37 Although such divisions impeded Nazarbayev’s consoli-
dation of his own power, he managed to hold a referendum in 1995 in which 
he received an extension of his five-year term until 2000, without a new presi-
dential election. In early elections in 1999 he was again elected to a seven-year 
term. And then, for the first time, Nazarbayev seriously began building his 
party of power. This was done by a combination of constitutional and legal 
provisions and the manipulation of elites and state resources. The process was 
difficult and influenced the whole party system. After 2001 the system was 
characterized, according to Isaacs, by the elite fragmentation, formation of 
new parties and the eventual pro-presidential consolidation.38
VI. BUILDING OF THE PARTY OF POWER FROM 1999 TO 2004  
AND DESTRUCTION OF THE OPPOSITION
To build a successful party of power and for it to achieve domination, 
it was necessary to survey the legal ground. Legally, this was done with the 
change of the Constitution and the adoption of laws with which Kazakhstan, 
and other post-Soviet republics, at the beginning of the 1990s formally legal-
ized multipartism and multiparty elections. Those laws were latter changed in 
Kazakhstan, in favor of the dominant party. The first post-Soviet Constitu-
tion of Kazakhstan was adopted in 1993.39 The new constitution kept the old 
model of the Parliament: the Supreme Soviet as the name of the legislature, 
its unicameral structure and mandate of five years (Chapter 12). The elec-
toral system was not mentioned. Parties were barely mentioned, albeit it was 
emphasized that they cannot be formed on religious grounds (Art. 58). Only 
36 Olcott, op. cit. (fn. 32), p. 116.
37 Kjærnet, H.; Satpaev, D.; Torjesen, S., Big Business and high-level Politics in Kazakh-
stan: An Everlasting Symbiosis?, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
2008, p. 95.
38 Isaacs, R., Elite Fragmentation and ProPresidential Party Consolidation: Understanding 
Party System Development in Kazakhstan since 2001, Journal of East European and 
Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1., 2011, p. 113.
39 Конституция Республики Казахстан 1993 года, https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/, 
March 17th 2016.
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two years later a new constitution40 was approved in the referendum and it 
founded a bicameral Parliament: the first chamber, the Mazhilis, whose 67 
MPs were elected by a majority system for a term of four years and the second 
chamber, the Senate, which consisted of two representatives from each region, 
who were elected by members of their assemblies for the same four-year term 
(Art. 50). The Constitution provides that MPs have no imperative mandate 
(Art. 52). The government is responsible to the President and the Parliament 
but, like in the Russian case, this was only a formal provision because Parlia-
ment in reality could not impose its views on the President or on the composi-
tion or the survival of the government.41 On the other hand, the Constitution 
accepted some restrictive provisions, which did not even exist in democratic 
systems. Thus, the President was forbidden to be a member of a political party. 
Although this limited his power, it was contrary to the mentioned Skach’s 
warning on why the integration of the powerful President in the party system 
is important for the stability of the political system. But no restriction could be 
sustained because the Constitution was changed in 1998 to favor Nazarbayev 
– the presidential term was extended from five to seven years, the upper age 
limit for President was abolished, and the lower limit was increased from 35 
to 40 years. The number of members of the Mazhilis increased from 67 to 77, 
and those ten new MPs were to be elected from electoral lists with the legal 
threshold of 7%.42 This meant a change from a majority electoral system to a 
mixed system, and for the first time, at least one segment of voting began to 
favor the development of the party system in the country. In addition to this 
favorable legal position, there were adverse social and political conditions that 
influenced the formation and activities of parties. Abazov argues that the main 
weakness of most opposition parties was their focus on the capital Astana 
and the neglect of the provinces.43 In addition, Isaacs connects the emergence 
of parties in Kazakhstan with the fragmentation of the elite, which began in 
40 Конституция Республики Казахстан Конституция принята на республиканском рефе-
рендуме 30 августа 1995 г., http://bestprofi.com/home/document/406962812?2, 
March 17th 2016.
41 Boban, D., Polupredsjednički sustavi Rusije i Poljske, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Za-
greb, 2011, pp. 129 – 130.
42 О внесении изменений и дополнений в Конституцию Республики Казахстан Закон 
Республики Казахстан от 7 октября 1998 года N 284-I, http://bestprofi.com/home/
document/88018580?3, March 17th 2016.
43 Abazov, R., The 1999 Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan, Electoral Studies, Vol. 20, 
No. 2, 2001, p. 316.
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1998 when former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin founded the Repub-
lican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RPPK).44 Isaacs argues that this was a 
significant event because the conflict and competition among the elite entered 
the public sphere.45 Disobedience of this party soon encountered a response 
by the regime and in the October 1999 elections the RPPK withdrew from the 
PR segment of voting because Kazhegeldin was disqualified from party lists for 
some administrative penalty.46
1999 was a turning point in the development of the party system as the 
Republican Party Otan emerged and would eventually come to dominate Ka-
zakhstan’s politics. During its first congress in March Otan merged with sever-
al other parties and thus began the consolidation of the party scene.47 The pur-
pose of its foundation was to consolidate the pro-presidential forces, providing 
Nazarbayev with electoral support and facilitate their domination in the PR 
segment of voting in the parliamentary elections that year.48 Nazarbayev was 
elected as its president, but as he, according to the Constitution, could not be 
a member of any party, he immediately suspended his membership.49 In the 
elections Otan scored a relative victory, winning 23 of 77 seats in the Mazhi-
lis.50 Although it still was not a domination, it was the beginning of its rise. 
In the early years the party itself was just as responsible for its success as the 
political circumstances were not favorable for other actors. Quite apart from 
the fragmentation of the elite that gave rise to the emergence of parties, these 
parties were marked by the inability (or lack of desire) to programmatically 
open themselves to the population because they often derived their interests 
on behalf of the elite, rather than as an effort to achieve social and economic 
progress in the country. An illustrative example of this is the foundation of a 
public association Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) in 2001. It was 
founded due to the personal and particular interests of a segment of the elites 
44 Isaacs, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 118.
45 Ibid.
46 Franklin, J., Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Elections August 2007, NORDEM Report 
6/2007, NORDEM and Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, 2007, p. 3.
47 Babak, op. cit. (fn. 31), p. 85.
48 Karmazina, op. cit. (fn. 27), p. 44.
49 Babak, op. cit. (fn. 31), p. 85.
50 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Kazakhstan, Parliamentary Chamber: Mazhilis, Elections 
held in 1999, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2165_99.htm, March 24th 
2016.
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that felt damaged by the distribution of wealth in the country.51 Nazarbayev 
was at first conciliatory toward them, but for the DCK that was not enough. 
They wanted to weaken the dominant role of the President in the political sys-
tem of Kazakhstan.52 Although it publicly expressed support to Nazarbayev, 
he eventually did not accept co-operation with DCK and along with the other 
part of the elite, he turned against it.53 The creation of the DCK was a shock for 
Nazarbayev because many prominent individuals were engaged in its found-
ing, from the Deputy Prime Minister Uraz Zhandosov to several MPs, minis-
ters and other prominent individuals.54 Junisbai and Junisbai emphasize that 
this intra-elite split combined with fragmented economic interests could have 
led to a change in the political system.55 In such a situation Nazarbayev had to 
gather the rest of the elite around himself in order to stabilize his rule. For this 
could serve his party, but unlike Putin who after the founding of United Rus-
sia’s mostly managed to gather the political elite and quickly get rid off rivals, 
Nazarbayev could not yet do that with Otan. Nevertheless, he was not passive 
and soon after there was a backlash aimed at the DCK from the regime. The 
following year its leader was sentenced to seven years in prison56 on charges of 
the abuse of power while he was Governor of the Pavlodar Oblast.57
Further consolidation of the President’s power and part of the elite’s power 
took place with a combination of legal and illegal methods. In addition to rely-
ing on the Constitution, certain laws were adopted that could also contribute 
to boosting the President’s power. After a “negative” experience of the regime 
with new parties, the Law on Parties in 200258 sought to give the party of 
power a legal advantage over its rivals. The content of the law initially did 
not suggest that it created a legal ground for the foundation of a hegemonic 
51 Isaacs, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 119.
52 Ostrowski, W., The legacy of the ‘Coloured Revolutions’: The Case of Kazakhstan, Journal 
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2 - 3, 2009, p. 355.
53 Karmazina, op. cit. (fn. 27), p. 45.
54 Isaacs, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 119.
55 Junisbai, B.; Junisbai, A., The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Eco-
nomic liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition, Demokratizatsiya, 
Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, p. 374.
56 Franklin, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 3.
57 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereinafter: RFE/RL), Kazakh Opposition leader 
Given Early Release, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063816.html, May 24th 
2013.
58 law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Political Parties, http://www.legislationline.org/
documents/action/popup/id/8899, January 11th 2016.
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system because it was based on principles that were characteristic for demo-
cratic political systems. One such principle is that parties must be organized 
according to the territorial principle (Art. 5, par. 4), thereby accepting the 
modern principle of their organization rather than continuing to apply the 
old Soviet principle of organizing parties by institutions and businesses, which 
allowed greater party control over the state and society. The law introduced a 
provision which prohibited the foundation of parties based on certain profes-
sions, race, nationality, ethnic origin and religion (Art. 5, par. 8). According 
to Ó Beacháin, this made it impossible to form ethnic Russian and Islamist 
parties that could be a threat to Nazarbayev.59 The law provided that a party 
had to be established by at least a thousand people at the inaugural congress 
(conference) but under the condition that they should represent two-thirds of 
the region (Art. 6, par. 1). This requirement was significantly complicated by 
the provision that requires that a party must have at least 50,000 members 
in all regions with at least 700 members in each one in order to be registered 
in the Ministry of Justice (Art. 10, par. 5). According to Art. 13, para. 1, the 
activity of a party can be suspended under a court decision for a period of 
three to six months for reasons listed in the law concerning the protection of 
the constitutional order of the country or the reference to social, ethnic, racial, 
religious, class or tribal discord. According to Art. 13, para. 2, in the case of the 
suspension of a party, its leaders and members within the specified period may 
be banned from appearing in the media or participating in public events. The 
law in Art. 14 enumerates the grounds on which courts can liquidate a political 
party. Particularly interesting are two reasons mentioned in para. 5, no. 6) and 
7): if the party twice did not take part in elections for Mazhilis and if less than 
3% of active voters voted for the party in the elections for Mazhilis.
According to the annual report of Freedom House in 2015, “The constitu-
tion makes the judiciary subservient to the executive branch. Judges are sub-
ject to political bias, and corruption is evident throughout the judicial system. 
Conditions in pretrial facilities and prisons are harsh. Police at times abuse de-
tainees and threaten their families, often to obtain confessions, and arbitrary 
arrest and detention remain problems.”60 With this in mind, Kazakh courts, 
which are controlled by the regime, can, due to a number of legal reasons, 
59 Ó Beacháin, D., Parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, September and October 2004, 
Electoral Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2005, p. 763.
60 Freedom House, Kazakhstan, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/
kazakhstan, January 14th 2016.
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suspend a party or completely liquidate it, making the courts an effective tool 
in the hands of the regime for controlling the party system. The same year 
saw the adoption of a restrictive media law against which journalists protested 
and which, among other things, prescribed punishment for defamation and 
determined that the law could be cited only by higher officials, but no other 
ones.61 Due to such restrictive provisions, the Law on Parties favored only 
Otan while it tried to prevent even the foundation of other parties. Existing 
parties, after the adoption of the law, had to re-register themselves and that 
reduced their number since only some satisfied the new legal requirements.62 
At the end of 2002 there were 19 parties, and in November 2003 only eight 
parties remained.63
VII. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PARTY OF POWER INTO 
THE DOMINANT PARTY
In addition to weakening the strength of opposition parties, Otan made 
further headway in the next parliamentary elections held in September and 
October 2004. Its goal, according to Ó Beacháin, was already clear at that time 
and that was to support President Nazarbayev.64 Eleven parties participated 
in elections, of which four parties were united in two electoral blocs.65 The 
pro-presidential parties were Otan, Asar (Together)66, the Democratic Party of 
Kazakhstan (DPK)67 and the electoral bloc Aist.68 The only opposition party 
that managed to enter the Parliament was Ak Zhol (Bright Path)69, founded 
in 2002, after the split in the DCK. According to Ó Beacháin, Ak Zhol was 
61 Vries, M. S. de; Sobis, I., Reluctant Reforms: The Case of Kazakhstan, Public Organiza-
tion Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2014, pp. 139 – 157.
62 Karmazina, L., Institutionalization of the Party System in Kazakhstan and Russia: A 
Comparative Analysis, Part II, Central Asia and the Caucusus, No. 1 (55), 2009, p. 
116.
63 Mishra, op. cit. (fn. 25), p. 321.
64 Ó Beacháin, op. cit. (fn. 59), p. 764.
65 Ibid.
66 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition: Election Results Falsified, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1054980.html, May 22nd 2013.
67 RFE/RL, Final Kazakh Election Results Announced, http://www.rferl.org/content/ar-
ticle/1055161.html, May 22nd 2013.
68 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition Wins – One Seat In Parliament, http://www.rferl.org/
content/article/1054978.html, May 22nd 2013.
69 Ó Beacháin, op. cit. (fn. 59), p. 768.
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the most credible alternative to the government. Behind the party stood a few 
wealthy businessmen and many former supporters of Nazarbayev70, albeit it 
won only one seat.71 After its founding the party offered constructive opposi-
tion that did not directly attacked Nazarbayev, but then later it turned into a 
radical opposition party.72 According to Junisbai and Junisbai, “In the context 
of the policy of Kazakhstan, radical opposition includes those who believe 
that the President and his administration are the primary obstacles to political 
reform and democratization.”73 Otan for the first time achieved an absolute 
majority in Mazhilis, winning 42 seats.74 After the election, ODIHR EOM 
in its report noted that “A number of aspects of the improved election legislation 
were not implemented in an effective and impartial manner [Italics in original].”75 
This claim contributed to the criticism of Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, president of 
the Mazhilis and one of the leaders of Otan, who criticized Nazarbayev and 
marked the elections as fraudulent, and the next year he became the main 
opposition candidate for President.76 Such a move to the opposition has not 
been an exception in Kazakhstan and this, according to Karmazina, has been 
for two reasons: one, some people, due to their excessive ambition have fallen 
out of favor, while others have violated the unwritten rules of the ruling elite.77 
The opposition nevertheless tried to pursue resistance and created the Coor-
dinating Council of Democratic Forces which consisted of the Ak Zhol, the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the DCK.78 Then, in the summer 2005, 
the association “For A Fair Kazakhstan” was registered.79
Otan’s victory in the 2004 elections, and its transformation into the domi-
nant party did not satisfy the regime. Between the 2004 and 2007 elections, 
70 Ibid., p. 765.
71 RFE/RL, op. cit. (fn. 67).
72 Junisbai, Junisbai, op. cit. (fn. 55), p. 386.
73 Ibid.
74 Franklin, op. cit. (fn. 46), p. 3.
75 Ibid., p. 1.
76 RFE/RL, Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Speaker Bluntly Criticizes Elections, But For What 
Purpose?, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055356.html, May 22nd 2013.
77 Karmazina, L., Opposition in Kazakhstan: Nagging Problems, Central Asia and the Cau-
casus, No. 4 - 5 (58 - 59), 2009, p. 177.
78 RFE/RL, Central Asia: Opposition Groups Seek Strength In Unity, http://www.rferl.org/
content/article/1057339.html, May 22nd 2013.
79 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition Alliance Registered, http://www.rferl.org/content/arti-
cle/1060383.html, May 22nd 2013.
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the control of the executive over the judiciary, the persecution of opposition 
politicians by the judiciary and the state’s repressive apparatus, the use of ad-
ministrative resources in favor of the dominant party and the use of legislation 
for its own interests, suggest that the strengthening of Otan was only possible 
thanks to the sponsorship of the President who was a dominant actor in the 
political system. In August 2005, provincial and local officials selected a new 
half of the second chamber of the Parliament, the Senate, and only candidates 
who belonged to the Otan or were non-partisans were selected.80 The pressure 
of the judiciary and the repressive apparatus against the opposition was mani-
fested in a series of examples. First, the public prosecutor in Almaty requested 
in December 2004, at the same time as the Orange Revolution took place in 
Ukraine, a ban on the DCK81 because “it violated national security laws”82, 
i.e., for calling for protests after the parliamentary elections in September.83 
In April 2005, the law prohibited demonstrations in the period before and 
after the elections84 and the next month the opposition weekly “Respublika” 
was banned.85 In November 2005 the former mayor of Almaty Zamanbek 
Nurkadilov was killed. The official investigation concluded that he had com-
mitted suicide by shooting himself twice in the chest before he shot himself in 
the head, while “For A Fair Kazakhstan” claimed it was a political murder.86 
Then in February 2006 co-chairman of Nagyz Ak Zhol Altynbek Sarsenbaev 
was killed.87 For this murder, five members of the Committee for National 
Security (CNS) were arrested.88 In the same month, the other co-chair of the 
Nagyz Ak Zhol Bulat Abilov, head of the Alga Peter Svoik and some journal-
80 RFE/RL, Kazakhstan: Senate Selection holds Unusual Significance, http://www.rferl.org/
content/article/1060774.html, May 23rd 2013.
81 Ostrowski, op. cit. (fn. 52), p. 358.
82 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition Fears Crackdown Is looming, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1056750.html, May 22nd 2013.
83 RFE/RL, Kazakhstan: Opposition Party Faces Official Ban Ahead of Elections, http://
www.rferl.org/content/article/1056931.html, May 22nd 2013.
84 Junisbai, Junisbai, op. cit. (fn. 55), p. 386.
85 RFE/RL, Central Asia: Uprisings, Democracy Movements Prompt Kazakh Curtailments, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059151.html, May 22nd 2013.
86 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition Figure’s Death Ruled Suicide, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1063345.html, April 19th 2016.
87 RFE/RL, Kazakhstan: Opposition Figure Found Shot Dead Near Almaty, http://www.
rferl.org/content/article/1065719.html, April 7th 2016.
88 RFE/RL, Kazakh Secret Agents Held Over Sarsenbaev’s Killing, http://www.rferl.org/con-
tent/article/1066001.html, May 24th 2013.
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ists were found by a court decision guilty for organizing an unauthorized rally 
in Almaty.89 In May, the opposition politician Alibek Zhumabaev was sen-
tenced to five years in prison for insulting the personal dignity and honor of 
President Nazarbayev.90
In parallel with the regime’s pressure, the opposition further fragmented. 
Ak Zhol split up in early 2005 and a new faction was founded, the above 
mentioned Nagyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path).91 The party was formally regis-
tered in March 200692 and in 2008 was renamed to the Azat.93 In early 2006, 
the government and the court refused to register a new party Alga (Forward) 
because they claimed that the signatures required for registration were not 
all valid.94 The National Social Democratic Party (NSDP) was founded in 
September 2006, and led by Tuyakbai.95 While the opposition was acting in 
adverse conditions, the Otan continued with its consolidation and in the mid-
dle of 2006 united with the party Asar, headed by the President’s daughter 
Dariga, in November Otan then united with the Civil Party of Kazakhstan 
(CPK), and in December with the Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan (APK). It 
then renamed itself into the People’s Democratic Party Nur Otan.96 Karmazi-
na argues that those events show the shift from the President’s mere support 
of Otan to his patronage over it.97
The President completely controlled the executive – under the Constitu-
tion and in practice – and this control he partly left to the Parliament only 
after he became Nur Otan’s patron in 2006 and the party strengthened its 
89 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition leaders Begin hunger Strike, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1066287.html, May 24th 2013.
90 RFE/RL, Kazakh Oppositionist Sentenced for Civil Disorder, http://www.rferl.org/con-
tent/article/1068443.html, May 24th 2013.
91 RFE/RL, Kazakhstan: Opposition Group Reappears Under New Name, http://www.rferl.
org/content/article/1058594.html, May 22nd 2013.
92 RFE/RL, Kazakh Authorities Register Opposition Group, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1066924.html, May 24th 2013.
93 Isaacs, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 120.
94 RFE/RL, Kazakh Court Upholds Ban on Alga Party, http://www.rferl.org/content/ar-
ticle/1068941.html, May 29th 2013.
95 RFE/RL, New Opposition Party Set up in Kazakhstan, http://www.rferl.org/content/
article/1071222.html, 30. May 30th 2013.
96 Kennedy, R., Consolidation of Political Parties in Kazakhstan Strengthens President’s 
hand, (01/24/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst), 2007, http://old.cacianalyst.
org/?q=node/4418, December 9th 2013.
97 Karmazina, op. cit. (fn. 62), p. 117.
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dominance in the party system. Then he could be sure that the illusion of 
separation of powers could be maintained, along with what looked like further 
democratization. In the end though, the President’s power was not disturbed 
at all. The formal transfer of part of the President’s power and control over the 
government to the Parliament was carried out by changing the Constitution 
before the 2007 elections. The powers of the President were reduced, but in 
practice this did not decrease his power in the political system. The number 
of members of the Parliament was increased. Under the new provision, of the 
107 deputies in the Mazhilis nine are appointed by the Assembly of Peoples 
of Kazakhstan, the coordinating body that brings together representatives of 
different ethnic groups in the country98, while other MPs are elected. For po-
tential consolidation of the party system it became important to repeal provi-
sions that public officials could not be party members. President Nazarbayev 
could finally, officially become the leader of Nur Otan.99 Although at that 
moment it was suitable only for Nur Otan, in the long term such a provision 
allowed parliamentary parties to enter into the executive, and therefore create 
a greater amount of democratic legitimacy for the government. In addition, 
the Constitutional law on elections was also changed, it introduced a PR at-
large electoral system and legal threshold of 7%.100 Nur Otan in these elections 
won all seats in the Mazhilis. Other parties were not only defeated but were 
completely thrown out of the Parliament. The multi-party system survived in 
Kazakhstan albeit in the Parliament a one-party system was created. Such a 
situation did not exist even in communist Poland and East Germany where 
satellite parties were controlled by the ruling Communist Party but their pres-
ence in the Parliament at least maintained the illusion of a multi-party system. 
Because opposition parties in Kazakhstan could not enter the Parliament, “the 
Majilis set up a Public Chamber in which all interested parties could present 
their ideas about the country’s economic and political future and suggest cor-
responding mechanisms.”101 Deliberation was in this way expelled from the 
98 Yves-Marie, D., Cultural mobilization in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: views from the state and 
from non-titular nationalities compared, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2012, p. 
20.
99 Isaacs, R., Managing Dissent, limiting Risk and Consolidating Power: The Processes and 
Results of Constitutional Reform in Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 
(49), 2008, p. 24.
100 О выборах в Республике Казахстан, http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z950002464_ (24. 
March 24th 2016).
101 Karmazina, op. cit. (fn. 62), p. 119.
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Parliament and transferred to the quasi-parliamentary body with no legisla-
tive or any other power. The opposition has instead established the People’s 
Parliament (Khalyk kenesi)102, also a quasi-parliamentary body whose founda-
tion showed that there was a crisis in the legitimacy of the political system. At 
that time, the stronger form of opposition than parties were businessmen and 
oligarchs whose interests authorities had to take into account.103 Such domi-
nance of Nur Otan did not stop increased pressure against the opposition. In 
May 2009, the leaders of Azat and unregistered Alga and co-chairman of the 
Communist Party were convicted for allegedly helping two criminals to gain 
political asylum in Ukraine.104 In October 2010, the head of the Alga Vladimir 
Kozlov announced his candidacy in the presidential elections in 2012 and 
after that the tax authorities announced that they are investigating him for 
tax evasion.105 In the early presidential elections in April 2011, Nazarbayev 
again won easily. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, Nur Otan had to leave 
part of the seats to other parties but its hegemony continued. It won 83 seats 
in the Parliament, Kazakhstan’s Democratic Party – Ak Zhol eight and the 
Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK) seven.106 In March 2015, 
Nazarbayev again convincingly won early presidential elections. In the March 
2016 parliamentary elections the superiority of Nur Otan was again confirmed 
by its winning 84 seats while Ak Zhol and CPPK won seven seats each.107
102 Ibid., p. 120.
103 Bowyer, A. C., Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan, Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute & Silk Road Studies Program - A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy 
Center, Washington, Stockholm, 2008, p. 20.
104 RFE/RL, Kazakh Court Upholds Convictions Of Opposition leaders, http://www.rferl.
org/content/Kazakh_Court_Upholds_Convictions_Of_Opposition_Lead-
ers/1788355.html, June 25th 2013.
105 RFE/RL, Kazakh Opposition Party leader In Tax Evasion Probe, http://www.rferl.org/
content/Kazakh_Opposition_Party_Leader_In_Tax_Evasion_Probe_/2204888.
html, February 9th 2015.
106 Kazakhstan Election Commission, Republic of Kazakhstan, legislative Election of 15 
January 2012, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/k/kazakhstan/kazakhstan 
2012.txt, March 21st 2016.
107 RFE/RL, Kazakh Ruling Party Wins Most Seats In Parliament, http://www.rferl.org/
content/kazakh-ruling-party-wins-most-seats-in-parliament/27628227.html, 
March 24th 2016.
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VIII. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM AND THE 
DOMINANT PARTY IN KAZAKHSTAN
The party system of Kazakhstan has certain similarities with the much 
better-known example of the party system of Russia. They are reflected in the 
emergence of the dominant party of power and crucial influence of the institu-
tions of the system of government on the party system. In addition, in these 
two countries the start of the millennium was marked by the strengthening of 
the President’s domination over all other actors and the beginning of his inte-
gration into the party system. But, there are also differences which primarily 
concern the relationship of the President to the parties. Unlike Russia, where 
Putin has influenced the formation of at least part of the formal opposition, 
while also being forced to accept the continued activities of the small, real op-
position, in Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, in recent years, has sought to establish 
a de facto one-party system.108 This system resembles the hegemonic party 
system of Sartori’s type, in which there are multiple parties but none of them 
can threaten the hegemonic ruling party. Those that entered the Parliament 
in the last two terms have been as pro-presidential as the dominant one. But 
before we can give a definitive answer on the question of whether Nur Otan is 
a hegemonic party, its position in the political system of Kazakhstan raises the 
question of whether it is really a political party in the true sense of the term. 
Sartori argues that a political party is a party only if it competes in elections 
for power.109 Nur Otan participates in elections and seeks various legal and 
other means to win a majority, or even all the seats in the Parliament.
However, Isaacs’s mentioned claim that this party does not have power nor 
is attaining power its goal, calls into question its character as a political party. 
While meeting all the legal requirements to be registered as such, and holding 
all the required organizational characteristics, Nur Otan can theoretically be 
considered a party; however, in functional terms it is only a semblance of a 
political party. In addition, according to Isaacs and Whitmore, Nur Otan is 
not a means for distributing benefits and resources nor the place for policy-
making.110 These features thus reduce the content of the term “party” for Nur 
108 Kennedy, op. cit. (fn. 96).
109 Sartori, op. cit. (fn. 5), p. 57.
110 Isaacs, R.; Whitmore, S., The limited agency and life-cycles of personalized dominant par-
ties in the post-Soviet space: the cases of United Russia and Nur Otan, Democratization, 
Vol. 21, No. 4, 2014, p. 700.
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Otan, albeit the Kazakh lawmakers were theoretically quite strict when it came 
to some other features that political parties should have. Thus, they (probably 
unknowingly) implemented Sartori’s claim about parties into the Law on Po-
litical Parties in 2002, in which there is a provision that the court may prohibit 
a party if it twice in a row does not participate in parliamentary elections.111 
In this way legislator forces all parties to function under Sartori’s criteria, with 
the exception of its own because in the current circumstances it does not com-
pete for power in the true meaning of the word. Although one might think that 
such a provision should encourage other parties to compete in the political 
arena, behind it can stand different motives. Some parties might boycott elec-
tions112, but the regime with such a provision discourages them from doing so, 
and they are forced by their participation in elections to legitimize the system 
and the existing election rules that they do not favor. Just as non-democratic 
actors in a consolidated democracy are forced to accept it “because a stable 
political and institutional framework conditions do not promise a successful 
system that is an alternative to democracy”113 so democratic actors in autoc-
racy are forced to accept the non-democratic rules of the game if they do not 
want to completely disappear from the political arena. 
Such policy with which the regime decides to consolidate itself has a nega-
tive effect on the regime in the long-run. With no possibility to participate in 
government, non-regime actors further radicalize themselves and thereby even 
mobilize in a manner that may eventually overthrow the regime. The regime 
must also constantly adapt to the existing dangers and even if it successfully 
removes or pacifies the opposition, it is success for a limited duration. An au-
tocratic regime can never consolidate itself like a democracy can, but can only 
experience temporary periods of stability. While democracy may become the 
“only game in town”, autocracy in most of the contemporary world embraces 
at least a germ of its own collapse, and therefore cannot become “the only 
game”. The very nature of democracy is the open access to power via free and 
fair elections, while the nature of autocracy is closed access. But precisely be-
cause it is closed, the opposition tries to find a variety of mechanisms to open 
it and thus destroys an essential element of this type of regime, which means 
111 Buluktaev, Y., 2004 Elections in Kazakhstan: Strategy and Tactics of the Political Parties, 
Central Asia and the Caucusus, No. 1 (31), 2005, p. 20.
112 Ibid.
113 Translated from: Merkel, W., Transformacija političkih sustava: Uvod u teoriju i empirijsko 
istraživanje transformacije, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Zagreb, 2011, p. 109.
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the opposition constantly seeks to destabilize the regime. Therefore, it cannot 
be expected that the conformist behavior of undemocratic actors in democracy 
could be accepted by non-regime actors in an autocracy.
IX. CONCLUSIONS: THE TYPE OF NUR OTAN’S HEGEMONY
We can conclude that Nur Otan is a political party in a legal sense and to 
some degree in a political sense, but of what type? Sartori splits his hegemonic 
party into two subtypes – the ideological-hegemonic party and the pragmatic-
hegemonic party, but in the post-Soviet space, some parties of power have a 
completely new feature that distinguishes them from Poland’s PUWP and 
Mexico’s IRP. Perhaps the most important feature is that, as we can see in 
Kazakhstan, they are not “hegemonic” in the entire political system, but only 
in the party system. Contrary to the PUWP and the IRP, the formation and 
coming to power of post-Soviet parties of power crucially depends on presi-
dents who are their founders, like Putin and Nazarbayev. The party of power 
is not necessarily a hegemonic party as it may be a temporary creation that 
disappears from the political scene if it does not achieve its goal, but each 
hegemonic party in the post-Soviet space is necessarily the party of power be-
cause its hegemonic status depends on its relation with the president. March 
goes further and argues that: 
“The crucial difference between the party of power and other hegem-
onic parties is that whereas the latter have mass membership, coher-
ent structures, and consistent ideologies and are the central conduits 
for policy making and patronage, in the former, the source of author-
ity lies entirely outside the party (in presidential structures). Moreo-
ver, the party of power is never completely “in power” but simply a 
disposable component of broader regime-type relationships – that is, 
a “hegemonic bloc” in the Gramscian sense – used instrumentally by 
those already in power to remain there.”114
The crucial difference between Nur Otan on the one side, and the PUWP 
and the IRP on the other, lays in the fact that both latter parties had heads 
who controlled them and were leaders of the country, but they did not have 
so much power as to disband their party, overthrow it or outlive it. That di-
rectly affects the power relations among the various actors within the politi-
114 March, L., Managing Opposition in a hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposi-
tion, Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, 2009, p. 510.
Zbornik PFZ, 67, (1) 55-83 (2017) 81
cal system. An important feature of post-Soviet political system is, like the 
Mexican during the existence of the hegemonic party system115, the powerful 
president who enjoys the greatest political power in the country. Nur Otan 
resembles some elements of pragmatic-hegemonic party more than ideological-
hegemonic party. First, like in Mexico not all other parties are its satellites, 
but there is a real opposition, even if it is weak. Second, the Mexican single-
mandate electoral system contributed to the power of the IRP as much as the 
proportional system contributes to the power of Nur Otan. But, there is also a 
big difference. Even if the Mexican Congress was weak116 and presidents ruled 
“in a manner that is reminiscent of the Roman-type dictator”117, according to 
the Mexican Constitution they could rule only one six-year term (Art. 83).118 
This prevented them from becoming long-term masters of their polity, like 
Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. According to an official of Nur Otan, Nur Otan’s 
ideal party is the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and parties in Sweden and 
Malaysia119, although knowing the contemporary political history of Japan and 
Sweden with their democratic political systems and much more competitive 
elections it is unclear how this could be linked.
The analysis in this article of the Constitution and relevant laws and po-
litical practice shows that Nur Otan corresponds to the essential elements of 
the Sartori’s definition of a hegemonic party: “The hegemonic party neither 
allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are 
permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; they are not permit-
ted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an 
equal basis.” Nevertheless, there is also a difference between the traditional 
hegemonic party and the hegemonic party in Kazakhstan. It is mainly in the 
fact that Nur Otan is not the ruling party which has the power, as Issacs em-
phasizes120, but it is only an aid that serves the President as the holder of the 
autocratic regime to solidify his authority. The survival of Nur Otan in power 
depends on Nazarbayev and his control of the country’s administrative re-
sources with which his party wins the elections, and not on the party’s control 
115 Langston, J., Breaking Out Is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico’s One-Party 
hegemonic Regime, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2002, p. 64.
116 Sartori, op. cit. (fn. 5), p. 208.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.; Constitution of Mexico, https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-
text-const.pdf, August 6th 2016.
119 Interview was given to the author of this article in February 2015 in Astana.
120 Isaacs, op. cit. (fn. 38), p. 115.
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of these resources. In these relations, Nazarbayev is the head of state and all 
others are below him, including Nur Otan. Therefore, its dependence on the 
President somewhat resembles the submission and dependence of the Party of 
Labour of Albania to Enver Hoxha and the Communist Party of Romania to 
Nicolae Ceauşescu. Although, of course, contemporary Kazakhstan does not 
correspond to Linz and Stepan’s concept of sultanistic regimes121, due to the 
existing power relations between the President and Nur Otan we can conclude 
that the latter is not likely to survive the current authoritarian regime after 
Nazarbayev’s departure from the political scene. Its power as the main politi-
cal organization in Kazakhstan does not have the characteristics of the kind 
of sustainability that the PUWP and the IRP had in the hegemonic systems in 
Poland and Mexico. Therefore, it is not an ideological-hegemonic or pragmat-
ic-hegemonic party, but a new subtype of hegemonic party that has emerged 
in the post-Soviet space. It may be due to its significant dependence on the 
President and hegemony within the party system, but not within the political 
system that designates parties like Nur Otan as a new subtype of hegemonic 
party – a presidential-hegemonic party.
121 Linz, Stepan, op. cit. (fn. 2).
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PREDSJEDNIČKO-HEGEMONIJSKA STRANKA I 
AUTOKRATSKA STABILNOST: PRAVNI TEMELJ I 
POLITIČKA PRAKSA U KAZAHSTANU
Postsovjetske stranke vlasti dominantne su stranke koje su nastajale u godinama nakon 
raspada SSSR-a. Stranka vlasti nije tip političke stranke, nego pojam koji označava 
da ih formira izvršna vlast stvarajući im legalnu i nelegalnu prednost pred ostalim 
strankama na izborima i u svakodnevnoj alokaciji resursa. U ovom radu pokušava se 
utvrditi je li kazahstanska stranka vlasti Nur Otan hegemonijska stranka koja se tako 
može definirati u skladu sa Sartorijevom definicijom tog tipa političke stranke. Odgovor 
na to pitanje nije važan samo zbog tipološkog etiketiranja te stranke, nego je ponajprije 
važan zbog toga što pomoću njega možemo dobiti uvid u institucionalne pretpostavke 
trajnosti postojećega autoritarnog režima u toj zemlji, ali i u ostalim suvremenim 
autoritarnim sustavima u kojima postoje višestranačje i ograničeni politički pluralizam. 
Nakon provedene analize ustava i zakona te političke prakse u Kazahstanu od 1991. 
do 2016. u radu se dolazi do zaključka da Nur Otan jest hegemonijska stranka u 
skladu sa Sartorijevom definicijom, ali da je to novi podtip hegemonijske stranke koja 
ostvaruje hegemoniju unutar stranačkog sustava, ali ne i u cijelome političkom sustavu 
kao klasične hegemonijske stranke 20. stoljeća. Zbog toga ne odgovara nijednome od dva 
Sartorijeva podtipa – ideološko-hegemonijske i pragmatično-hegemonijske stranke – te je 
zbog presudne uloge predsjednika države u ostvarivanju njezine hegemonije u stranačkom 
sustavu nazvana predsjedničko-hegemonijska stranka. Ta stranka pridonosi trenutačnoj 
stabilnosti autokratskog režima u Kazahstanu, ali su zbog njezine ograničene hegemonije 
unutar samo stranačkog sustava, ali ne i političkog sustava u cjelini, institucionalne 
pretpostavke trajnosti režima nakon odlaska Nursultana Nazarbajeva s čela države 
nesigurne.
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